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South Sudan’s Newest War: 
When Two Old Men Divide a Nation
Carlo Koos and Thea Gutschke
A political power struggle between South Sudanese president Salva Kiir and former 
vice president Riek Machar resulted in violent clashes between ethnic army factions 
in December 2013. Since then fighting has spread across South Sudan and claimed the 
lives of around 10,000 people.
Analysis
South Sudan has experienced several insurgencies since gaining independence in 2011. 
Nevertheless, the current war has the potential to be more destructive to the country 
than previous ones because both parties -  President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, and his 
opponent, former vice president Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer -  are instrumentalizing 
ethnic identities and pulling their communities into their personal feud.
■ A number of latent issues have contributed to the current crisis. These include 
South Sudan's dysfunctional political system and inadequate political leadership, 
the historical distrust between the Dinka and the Nuer, and the country's unhealthy 
dependence on oil rents.
■  The civilian population is carrying the cost of the conflict. More than 10,000 people 
have been killed and more than one million displaced since the outbreak of the 
latest violence. Livelihoods have been destroyed and more than 3.7 million people, 
approximately a third of the population, are estimated to be at risk of food insecurity.
■  The short- and long-term economic consequences for South Sudan are harsh. Oil 
production has dropped by 40 percent, severely affecting the state's budget. Trade 
has suffered. In the long run, political instability will jeopardize foreign direct 
investment in South Sudan.
■ The international community's reaction has been varied: Neighboring countries 
have supported the government diplomatically and militarily, while the United 
States and the European Union plan to impose sanctions on the leaders of both sides 
of the conflict. China has taken an active role in the ongoing peace process.
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Finally Independence and Then War Again
The recent history of the newest nation on the 
globe has been troubled. When the South Suda­
nese voted for independence in 2011, many of 
them foresaw a future of freedom, peace, devel­
opment, and prosperity. The international com­
munity expected progress, too. Yet since South 
Sudan's independence in 2012, the world has 
mostly received bleak news from the country. Re­
ports of ethnic violence, local insurgencies, wide­
spread corruption, the autocratic practices of the 
dominant Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM), and border conflicts with the country's 
northern neighbor, Sudan, have been common in 
the headlines.
The recent political and violent conflict be­
tween President Salva Kiir and former vice pres­
ident Riek Machar, both members of the SPLM, 
represents a new dimension of instability. The 
conflict could potentially result in a failed state, 
an outcome that could destabilize the whole re­
gion. This article summarizes how the crisis has 
evolved and which latent factors have contributed 
to it. Based on this analysis, it then discusses the 
humanitarian and economic implications of the 
conflict, as well as its impact on South Sudan's in­
ternational relations.
From Internal Power Struggle to Civil War
The O utbreak o f  Violence
The current crisis began in July 2013 when Pres­
ident Kiir sacked his entire cabinet, including 
his chief rival, Vice President Riek Machar, with­
out giving any reasons. Analysts agree that Kiir's 
move exposed a power struggle that had been tak­
ing place within South Sudan's ruling party, the 
SPLM. A number of senior SPLM members, in­
cluding Machar and the SPLM's secretary-gener­
al, Pagan Amum, had increasingly viewed Kiir's 
leadership as autocratic. Kiir's decision was ap­
parently also further driven by Machar's aspira­
tions to run as the SPLM's presidential candidate 
in the upcoming elections in 2015.
There is a distinct ethnic element to power 
and politics in South Sudan. President Kiir be­
longs to the Dinka, the largest ethnic communi­
ty in South Sudan with 36 percent of the popula­
tion. Machar belongs to the Nuer, the second-larg­
est ethnic community with 16 percent of the pop­
ulation. Although the power struggle between Ki- 
ir and Machar is not an ethnic one per se, it has se­
vere implications for relations between the Dinka 
and Nuer communities. The ethnic equilibrium in 
the government -  a Dinka as president and a Nuer 
as vice president -  has been widely viewed as an 
important safeguard to preserve stability between 
the two largest ethnic communities.
At 10:00 p.m. on 16 December 2013, fighting 
erupted among the presidential guards in Juba. 
According to military sources, the fighting start­
ed when unexpected changes were made to the 
guards' deployment. An argument between the 
groups is believed to have ignited the clash that 
left approximately 20 dead. Other reports say that 
fighting broke out after President Kiir ordered the 
arrest of dissident politicians. Following the initial 
clash, Kiir accused Machar and other SPLM offi­
cials of attempting a coup against his government
-  which Machar denied. Several government offi­
cials were arrested for their alleged links to the vi­
olence, including Pagan Amum. Machar fled Juba 
for his home, Jonglei State. In the following days, 
targeted ethnic killings of civilians took place in 
Juba, illustrating the immediate ethnic implica­
tions of the political power struggle between Ki- 
ir and Machar.
During the days and weeks after the clash­
es erupted in Juba, heavy fighting between army 
units loyal to the government and rebel forces loy­
al to Machar spread to the states of Jonglei, Unity, 
Central Equatoria, and Upper Nile. Machar had 
the support of 10,000 recent army deserters and 
a number of local militias. Among the latter was 
the White Army, which consists of approximate­
ly 25,000 armed Nuer youth. The fact that 10,000 
troops broke rank demonstrates that almost 10 
years of security sector reform in South Sudan 
have failed to address ethnic fragmentation with­
in the South Sudanese army.
In December 2013, rebels held the strategically 
important towns of Bor, Bentiu, and Malakal. The 
latter two are particularly important hubs for the 
oil industry. Using aerial bombardment (alleged­
ly carried out by the Ugandan army), the govern­
ment was able to regain control of Bor and Bentiu. 
Control over Malakal and Bentiu has shifted be­
tween rebel forces and government troops sever­
al times since the end of 2013. While the army has 
secured a number of strategically important tar­
gets such as major towns and oil infrastructure, 
the rebels have retreated into the bush and started
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attacking government troops using guerilla tactics 
(International Crisis Group 2014, HIIK 2013).
Failed Cease-fires
After fighting broke out in December 2013, the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), a regional association of states includ­
ing Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda, 
quickly mandated three envoys to broker a peace 
deal between Kiir and Machar. Under the auspic­
es of IGAD, the warring parties signed a cease-fire 
deal on 23 January 2014. This deal has, however, 
been violated on several occasions since.
On 10 April 2014, four months after the out­
break of violence, Machar's spokesman an­
nounced that the rebels were planning to estab­
lish a nationwide rebel government intended to 
"collectively and adequately address the current 
concerns on peace, security as well as humanitar­
ian situation in the country" (Sudan Tribune, 10 
April 2014). Whether or not the rebels will achieve 
influence in all of South Sudan's 10 states is de­
batable. Yet their aspirations are of a new quali­
ty and dimension. Other insurgencies since South 
Sudan's independence have been limited to cer­
tain areas (George Athor in Jonglei State, Gatluak 
Gai in Unity State, etc.). They have been instigated 
by renegade army officers who aimed to increase 
their bargaining power and obtain a better post in 
the national army. In other cases local rebellions 
have been a response to election defeats. In these 
cases the rebel leaders have generally been bought 
off with lucrative government or army posts.
Further peace talks between Kiir and Mach­
ar, mostly about the destiny of four former senior 
government officials, including sacked SPLM sec­
retary-general Pagan Amum, were still stalled as 
of the end of April. On 9 May, after the four de­
tainees had been released from prison and in re­
sponse to international pressure to end the ethnic 
violence, Kiir and Machar agreed on a one-month 
cease-fire and signed a peace deal. Yet only hours 
after signing, each party accused the other of at­
tacking its opponent's troops in several locations.
In general, both Kiir and Machar have demon­
strated relatively little desire to reach a compro­
mise during the peace talks. Despite the fact that 
thousands of civilians have been killed in recent 
violence and almost one million people remain 
displaced, they have been unwilling to overcome 
their largely interpersonal dispute.
Machar's motives go beyond private benefits 
for him and his support base. Machar had a ma­
jor dispute about leadership and democracy with­
in the SPLM with Kiir's predecessor, John Ga- 
rang, in 1991. He has brought this emotional and 
ideological baggage into the current conflict and 
the accompanying peace process; he wants to see 
change at any cost in what is widely perceived as 
a Dinka-dominated government. These factors 
promise to severely hamper reconciliation efforts 
with Kiir.
Factors Fueling the Current Crisis
The current political crisis and the armed conflict 
between the government and rebel forces loyal to 
Machar can be partly explained by the personal 
motives of and struggle between Kiir and Machar. 
However, there are a number of additional factors 
that have contributed to the current civil war that 
go beyond these two actors' individual decisions.
A D ysfunctional P olitica l System  
Formally, the South Sudanese state is well de­
signed. It features a classic division of powers 
(legislative, executive, and judicial branch), and 
the federal design takes into account the cultural 
and regional differences within South Sudan and
-  in theory -  delegates substantial decision-mak­
ing power to the federal states. The fact is, howev­
er, that the South Sudanese central state is largely 
under the control of the former rebel movement, 
the SPLM. Former SPLM officers or persons loy­
al to the group occupy most senior positions in all 
branches of the state, including the subnational 
levels. Formal qualifications have rarely been the 
key criteria for obtaining a specific government 
position, and the state's performance has suffered 
as a result. The SPLM's informal networks have 
sidelined the formal democratic institutions and 
processes provided through the South Sudanese 
constitution, which has reduced the population's 
confidence in the state. The result is a weak state 
with limited institutional capacity, a lack of legit­
imacy, and an unhealthy symbiosis between the 
armed forces, the government, and the state (Koos 
2014).
Old Men Facing New Challenges
President Kiir and former vice president Machar
were decorated generals during the civil war with
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the central government of Sudan. Under their 
leadership, rebels controlled most of the South 
Sudanese territory -  apart from garrison towns 
and strategic oil fields. These experiences deeply 
shaped these men's leadership style and the way 
they deal with conflict.
The challenges faced by South Sudan following 
the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agree­
ment (CPA) in 2005 demanded fundamentally dif­
ferent skills. The political leaders were given the 
task of building a state, with the assistance of the 
international community. This involved not on­
ly creating state institutions but also developing 
a national identity and reconciling a divided pop­
ulation. In a nation with dozens of ethnic groups 
and deep-seated ethnic identities, this required 
that the leaders bring these groups together and 
facilitate the creation of a South Sudanese identity 
that transcended ethnic boundaries.
H istorical D istrust between the Dinka 
and the Nuer
Although the Dinka and the Nuer fought side by 
side against the government in Khartoum for de­
cades, their relationship has been ambivalent. In 
1991, internal leadership struggles between late 
SPLM leader John Garang (Dinka) on the one side 
and his deputy, Riek Machar (Nuer), and Lam 
Akol (Shilluk) on the other led to a split within the 
SPLM. Machar and Akol created the SPLM-Nasir 
faction. The major blowback for the SPLM (Din- 
ka) was not only that a large faction of its troops 
broke away in a critical phase of the war, but also 
that the SPLM-Nasir faction switched sides to ally 
with the central government in Khartoum. After 
becoming Khartoum's new proxy in the civil war, 
the SPLM-Nasir, consisting mainly of Nuer fight­
ers, killed at least 2,000 Dinka civilians in the town 
of Bor, in what was known as the Bor massacre, on 
15 November 1991. Even though this happened al­
most a quarter of a century ago, the event remains 
present in the collective memory of the Dinka and 
the Nuer and has the potential to fuel resentment 
in the current struggle.
Oil Rents Sponsor the Government's 
Underperformance
Governments that depend largely on income from 
natural resource extraction often face a dilemma, 
popularly known as the "resource curse." This ap­
plies by and large to South Sudan, which has the 
most oil-dependent budget in the world. Govern­
ments that do not depend on their citizens' tax­
es and by extension on their citizens' goodwill 
tend to do a poor job at policy making, the pro­
vision of public goods, and development policy. 
This has been true in South Sudan. The govern­
ment has largely failed to improve the popula­
tion's living conditions and appears to be much 
more concerned with internal competitions about 
rent-seeking and access to resources and power.
The government's poor performance and its 
underprovision of public goods is particularly 
critical in the federal states of Jonglei, Unity, and 
Upper Nile. Chronic insecurity in recent years has 
also hampered development efforts in these ar­
eas and increased the population's dissatisfaction 
with the government.
Impacts of the Civil War
The current violence, which has now lasted five 
months, has severely deteriorated the humanitar­
ian and economic situation in South Sudan and in 
its neighboring countries.
H um anitarian Crisis
Since fighting erupted in Juba in December 2013, 
seven out of South Sudan's 10 states have been af­
fected by the violence, which has left an estimat­
ed 10,000 people dead and over one million dis­
placed (UNHCR 2014). Large parts of the South 
Sudanese population have faced atrocities, dis­
placement, and food shortages. As of the begin­
ning of May, fighting and food insecurity had 
forced more than 400,000 people to flee to neigh­
boring countries. Up to 100,000 South Sudanese 
refugees had entered each of Ethiopia and Ugan­
da. Yet most of the people fleeing their homes have 
remained within South Sudan's borders. Approx­
imately 80,000 of the more than 800,000 internally 
displaced persons have sought shelter within lo­
cal bases of the United Nations Mission in South 
Sudan (UNMISS). However, even these supposed­
ly safe camps have come under attack, and people 
seeking refuge have been targeted and killed.
UN agencies and international nongovernmen­
tal organizations are trying to help the 3.7 million 
people -  one-third of the entire South Sudanese 
population -  at high risk of severe food insecu­
rity. At the beginning of April, the World Food 
Programme announced plans to supply the pop­
ulation of South Sudan's remote areas with about
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30,000 tons of food. By 14 April 2014, it had pro­
vided food assistance to almost 600,000 displaced 
South Sudanese (World Food Programme 2014). 
However, the government has partly stalled or 
blocked humanitarian aid supplies. It has also re­
stricted UNMISS patrols and helicopter opera­
tions. Hence, the humanitarian situation remains 
dramatic, and it is the civilians who are suffering 
most from the crisis.
Econom ic Consequences: A Setback fo r  Regional 
Econom ic D evelopm ent
Although it is difficult to quantify the decline in 
South Sudan's output that has resulted from the 
conflict, severe economic effects have become in­
creasingly apparent, and the country's fiscal po­
sition has deteriorated as government revenues 
have decreased. This has resulted in budgetary 
constraints and the abandonment of government 
plans to increase investment.
The disruption of oil production due to the vi­
olence has had the largest economic impact, as 98 
percent of the government's income stems from 
the oil industry. When fighting spread to the oil- 
rich states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile, the 
already-reduced oil output decreased by a further 
40 percent since oil-field technicians were either 
evacuated or fled the troubled areas. Production 
in the Upper Nile and Unity states declined par­
ticularly steeply, with the latter recording a loss 
of output of about 50,000 barrels per day (b/d) as 
oil fields were shut down in January 2014. While 
this drop represented approximately half of Unity 
State's usual capacity, production in Upper Nile 
was not as heavily affected. Nevertheless, the out­
put from Upper Nile's blocks 3 and 7, the two most 
productive blocks in South Sudan, decreased from 
about 200,000 b/d to approximately 160,000 b/d.
At the same time as the country's oil income 
has declined, the costs incurred by the conflict 
have eroded the small funding reserves accumu­
lated since oil exports were resumed in summer 
2013. For instance, in February 2014 the country's 
legislative assembly approved a supplementa­
ry budget of 749 million South Sudanese pounds 
(254 million USD) to cover the costs generated by 
the conflict.
The impact of the drop in oil production has 
not been limited to South Sudan: Oil transit fees 
and money from a transitional financial arrange­
ment constitute an important source of income for 
Sudan. China, the biggest investor in South Su­
dan's oil fields and the main purchaser of its crude 
oil, also felt the fallout from the crisis as oil com­
panies such as the state-owned China National Pe­
troleum Corporation and Sinopec were forced to 
evacuate their workers from fields in Unity State.
The violence has also made subsistence farm­
ing impossible or considerably more difficult for 
large parts of the population, thus leading to fam­
ine. Furthermore, day-to-day commercial activi­
ty in South Sudan has been disrupted, and thou­
sands of foreign workers from neighboring coun­
tries have returned home. Several thousand Ugan­
dans working in South Sudan's construction and 
service sector have left. This has also affected 
Ugandan society, as remittances from Ugandans 
working in South Sudan are an important source 
of income for their families back home. Since 2006, 
South Sudan has bought 20 percent of Uganda's 
export goods, making it Uganda's largest cus­
tomer. The increased insecurity and instability in 
South Sudan has thus had a devastating impact on 
the Ugandan economy.
The violence and instability have also affected 
the small traders and large firms of Kenya, South 
Sudan's other, growing trade partner. Approxi­
mately 20,000 (of 27,000) Kenyans have returned 
home already, including small traders who have 
lost stocks and assets. In 2012, Kenyan exports 
to South Sudan were valued at 209 million USD. 
Shipments to and from South Sudan account­
ed for approximately 12 percent of transit traffic 
at the Mombasa port, an increase of 83.8 percent 
over 2011. Due to the violence, exports to South 
Sudan have dropped off, since cargo bound for 
the country cannot be transported. Large Kenyan 
firms including banks, road freight companies, 
and clearing agents have temporarily suspended 
their work in South Sudan. In 2012, Kenyan banks 
withdrew approximately 47 percent of their non­
domestic profits from the South Sudanese mar­
ket. Before the outbreak of the current conflict the 
Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) had announced 
plans for further expansion, and the Central Bank 
of Kenya had held talks to establish an official ex­
change rate with South Sudan. However, the KCB 
has since closed three of its 22 branches in South 
Sudan in response to the violence.
The conflict has also impacted regional eco­
nomic and political integration. For instance, it 
has eroded South Sudan's previously slim chance 
of being admitted to the East African Community 
in 2014. It has also jeopardized the 20 billion USD
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Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Cor­
ridor (LAPSSET) project between Kenya, Ethiopia, 
and South Sudan, which is to develop a new port 
in Lamu, Kenya and an oil pipeline from South 
Sudan. Fighting has already delayed the signing 
of the agreement on the oil pipeline, which was 
scheduled for December 2013. If South Sudan 
drops out entirely, this will impact the project's 
potential profitability since South Sudan has the 
major share of oil deposits.
While South Sudan was able to attract some­
what more foreign investment after the resump­
tion of oil exports in mid-2013, the renewed uncer­
tainty about oil production as well as the insecuri­
ty and political instability are likely to discourage 
major foreign investment in the near future. All in 
all, the conflict is a significant setback for regional 
integration and development.
Foreign Response: Futile Attempts to Contain the 
H um anitarian Crisis and R esolve the P olitica l 
Struggle
Given the conflict's economic impacts and the se­
curity and stability risks resulting from the prolif­
eration of small arms in South Sudan's neighbor 
countries, many external political actors are very 
interested in securing a cease-fire and settling the 
conflict. However, these actors are proceeding in 
very different manners.
Uganda, which views the continuing conflict 
as threatening its northern regions with instabil­
ity, has sent troops to support the South Suda­
nese government militarily. The Sudanese gov­
ernment in Khartoum shares South Sudan's inter­
est in maintaining the stability of and control over 
the oil fields. However, there is a lack of mutu­
al trust between the two countries. Nevertheless, 
Sudan has provided cautious support and agreed 
to send 900 oil-field technicians. Kenya and Ethio­
pia have supported attempts at conflict settlement 
through diplomatic means. For instance, Kenyan 
president Kenyatta and Ethiopian prime minister 
Desalegn met with Kiir on 26 December 2013 in 
Juba and have also promoted the cease-fire efforts 
within the framework of the IGAD. The IGAD-led 
mediation process, which has already held sever­
al negotiations, has been supported not only by 
IGAD member states but also by development 
partners and the wider international community. 
US Special Envoy Donald Booth and EU Special 
Representative Alexander Rondos -  and even the 
Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi -  attended the
cease-fire talks in Addis Ababa. Although China is 
the most important investor in the South Sudanese 
oil industry and the largest buyer of its oil, South 
Sudan is a rather small investment and oil source 
for China. Wang Yi's attendance at the peace talks 
is an unusually active stance for Chinese stan­
dards, since China normally pursues a strategy of 
noninterference in other countries' internal affairs. 
China's approach indicates that the current crisis 
threatens its interests in South Sudan.
The IGAD members Ethiopia, Uganda, Su­
dan, Kenya, Djibouti, and Somalia have provided 
support for monitoring mechanisms and peace­
keeping troops, increasing the probability of even 
greater regional involvement in South Sudan's 
conflict: In order to restore stability, IGAD decid­
ed on 13 March 2014 to establish a Protection and 
Deterrent Force as part of the IGAD Monitoring 
and Verification Mechanism. This force deployed 
troops from Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, 
and Djibouti to protect vital installations, includ­
ing oil fields, in South Sudan. South Sudan also 
called on Zimbabwe to support IGAD in this at­
tempt. In April 2014, IGAD officially began moni­
toring the January 2014 cease-fire, deploying mili­
tary forces to Bor, Bentiu, and Malakal and estab­
lishing a joint technical committee. The latter com­
prises representatives of the two warring parties, 
IGAD, the African Union, the UN, and other states 
backing the peace process and is designed to su­
pervise the monitoring of the cease-fire. Howev­
er, questions about its mandate, composition, and 
funding remain undecided.
In order to resolve the South Sudanese conflict 
politically, IGAD, Ethiopia, and South Africa fa­
cilitated the formation of an internal SPLM recon­
ciliation forum at the beginning of April 2014. The 
African Union established a Commission of Inqui­
ry to investigate human rights violations and oth­
er crimes committed since the violence broke out.
As stated above, nonregional international ac­
tors such as UN agencies and international non­
governmental organizations have also provid­
ed aid and assistance to the people affected by 
the violence. On 27 December 2013, the UN- 
MISS reinforcement troops, already mandated be­
fore the eruption of the latest political crisis, ar­
rived in South Sudan. On 3 February 2014, the UN 
launched an appeal for 1.27 billion USD to fund 
the various aid agencies and organizations. How­
ever, the UNMISS has been undermined by inter­
ference on the part of the South Sudanese govern-
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ment. Not only has the latter impeded aid sup­
plies as well as UNMISS patrols and operations, 
but it has also hampered UN actions through neg­
ative media reports, anti-UN demonstrations, and 
the harassment of UN staff. This has resulted in a 
new low in relations between the South Sudanese 
government and the UN.
Finally, several states from outside eastern Af­
rica have made attempts at conflict resolution. In 
March 2014, the United States, Norway, the Unit­
ed Kingdom, and the EU threatened to impose 
sanctions on the South Sudanese government and 
the Machar rebels if they continued to undermine 
the peace process by not engaging constructive­
ly in the IGAD-led mediation and by not comply­
ing with the cease-fire. The threats were dismissed 
by the South Sudanese government as an inter­
ference in its internal affairs and thus a violation 
of the state's sovereignty. However, as the large- 
scale violence continues to destroy the country 
and its society, further UN Security Council mem­
bers have also considered sanctions. Although the 
US has authorized targeted sanctions such as visa 
bans and the seizure of assets, none have yet been 
imposed.
The external political actors' reactions to the 
South Sudanese crisis have varied in type and 
scope. However, the government and the rebels 
have obstructed both the direct attempts of aid or­
ganizations to alleviate suffering and contain the 
humanitarian crisis and the diplomatic attempts 
of international organizations and single states to 
promote the peace process and resolve the political 
conflict. At the same time, South Sudan's economy 
and society are becoming increasingly unstable.
Overall, the power struggle between Presi­
dent Kiir and former vice president Machar has 
dragged South Sudan into a new, serious crisis in 
which the civilian population is bearing the brunt 
of the consequences. Neighboring countries are 
supporting the South Sudanese government both 
politically and militarily, and IGAD and the in­
ternational community have increased diplomat­
ic pressure on Kiir and Machar to achieve a peace 
agreement. However, the two have demonstrated 
little desire to overcome their personal feud and 
settle the conflict. It is increasingly apparent that 
South Sudan's current political leaders are unable 
and unwilling to deliver what the nation needs 
most urgently: peace, development, and unity.
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